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A literature review of empirical studies of philanthropy: 
Eight mechanisms that drive charitable giving 
 
Abstract  
We present an overview of the academic literature on charitable giving, based on a literature 
review of over 500 articles. We structure our review around the central question of why people 
donate money to charitable organizations. We identify eight mechanisms as the most important 
forces that drive charitable giving: (1) awareness of need; (2) solicitation; (3) costs and benefits; 
(4) altruism; (5) reputation; (6) psychological benefits; (7) values; (8) efficacy. These 
mechanisms can provide a basic theoretical framework for future research explaining charitable 
giving. 
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A literature review of empirical studies of philanthropy: 
Eight mechanisms that drive charitable giving 
 
An overwhelming body of knowledge is available on philanthropy in the social sciences. 
Research on philanthropy appears in journals from very different disciplines, including 
marketing, economics, social psychology, biological psychology, neurology and brain sciences, 
sociology, political science, anthropology, biology, and evolutionary psychology. Scholars as 
well as practitioners educated in these disciplines could benefit from a systematic survey of the 
mechanisms studied in the academic literature. We present an overview of research on 
determinants of charitable giving from all disciplines.  
More than thirty years ago, David Horton Smith wrote that “scholars concerned about 
voluntary action research should consciously seek out cross-disciplinary inputs” (D. H. Smith, 
1975), a call that Payton, Tempel and Rosso (Payton, Tempel, & Rosso, 1991) and Clotfelter 
(1997) more recently made as well. Since the 1980s, philanthropic studies have emerged as a 
new, multi-disciplinary field in the social sciences (Katz, 1999). However, a strong tendency in 
the past 30 years towards specialization among scientists in different disciplines has created the 
undesirable situation that scholars usually know little about the insights gathered in other 
disciplines. In addition, few of the insights from the academic literature have found their way in 
handbooks on fundraising. The assessment by Lindahl and Conley (2002) that fundraising is “a 
field in need of a greater base of substantive, objective research rather than a casual acceptance of 
anecdotical evidence” still holds. For instance, Warwick’s (2001) guide to successful fundraising 
letters contains literally zero references to scientific research. This paper aims to guide scholars 
as well as practitioners in the third sector through the available knowledge on determinants of 
charitable giving by individuals and households. We define charitable giving as the donation of 
money to an organization that benefits others beyond one’s own family. 
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Previous reviews available to researchers in philanthropy are mostly confined to a specific 
discipline or a limited period of time. Recently, Sargeant and Woodliffe (2007) reviewed the 
literature on charitable giving from a marketing perspective. Reviews in the field of social 
psychology have dealt with helping behaviour in general (Batson, 1998; Piliavin & Charng, 1990; 
Schroeder, Dovidio, Penner, & Piliavin, 1995; S. H. Schwartz, 1975). Helping behaviour is a very 
broad category of actions, ranging from assisting a stranger in an emergency (e.g., saving 
somebody from a fire, (Latané & Darley, 1970) to donating a piece of one’s body to a relative 
(e.g., bone marrow donation; Schwarz and Howard, 1980). Charitable giving is studied as an 
example of helping behaviour in the social psychological literature. The subject gained popularity 
in mainstream social psychology towards the end of the 1970s, and continued to be studied in 
applied social psychology in the 1980s. However, charitable giving is likely to be different from 
many other forms of helping behaviour. One crucial difference is that the recipient of charitable 
donations is usually absent from the context in which a donation is made, while the beneficiary is 
present in the helping situation investigated in most studies conducted in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Presence of a beneficiary strongly affects the social dynamics and motivations for helping 
behaviour, but is atypical for many examples of philanthropy. The present review differs from 
that by Piliavin and Charng (1990) in that we are not concerned primarily with the question to 
what extent prosocial behavior can be considered altruistic.  
Our review also differs from that of the overviews of economic theories of giving by 
Andreoni (2006), Vesterlund (2006) and Meier (2007b). Economists are increasingly trying to 
incorporate basic insights from sociology and social psychology into their models. However, 
many classical studies that provided these insights are unknown or not cited in present day 
economics. Our review may serve as a reference resource for classical intuitions. In addition, we 
present studies in disciplines like marketing, geography and biology that are not well known. 
To our knowledge, no systematic reviews on philanthropy exist in the fields of sociology 
or psychology. Sociologist John Wilson (2000) reviewed the literature on volunteering. Because 
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volunteering like philanthropy is a form of formal prosocial behaviour, there are many striking 
parallels between their respective determinants.  
Our review differs from the reviews by Sargeant (1999), Lindahl and Conley (2002), 
Havens, O’Herlihy and Schervish (2007) and Sargeant and Woodliffe (2007), by covering a 
longer period of time, studies from a larger number of sources, and ordering the material in 
different categories. Many of the categories used in previous reviews are broad groups of 
predictors. We present predictors of philanthropy in terms of eight mechanisms that explain why 
these predictors are related to philanthropy.  
We hope that our review will not only be useful for an academic audience, but also for 
practitioners. Experimental studies often shed light upon why some people are more likely to give 
and some give more generously than others. Fundraisers can take advantage of the insights 
gained in these studies to increase fundraising effectiveness.  
 
METHODS 
This paper is based on an extensive literature search that we conducted using seven types 
of sources. We searched (1) online full text collections of publishers (Wiley Interscience, 
Emerald Insight, SpringerLink, Sage Journals Online; Elsevier’s Scirius); (2) academic databases 
(PsychInfo, Sociological Abstracts, PubMed, EconLit); (3) Google Scholar; (4) the authors’ own 
literature databases; (5) the references cited in the articles we found; (6) the IUPUI Payton 
Library Philanthropic Studies Index; (7) Arnova Abstracts. We used the following keywords: 
donations, philanthropy, charitable giving, charitable behavio(u)r, altruism, helping, prosocial 
behavior. We concluded our search in August 2007. The results of this search formed the basis 
for this paper. References to articles that have been published since we concluded our search have 
been updated. 
Then we refined our search to include only papers that contained empirical analyses of 
charitable giving by adult individuals or households. Theoretical papers (not reporting empirical 
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data), studies using children as participants, and studies on charitable behaviour of organizations 
are not reviewed. Studies on contributions to public goods in experiments are included only when 
such contributions involve real monetary donations to real charitable organizations. Studies 
identifying individuals as beneficiaries (e.g., ‘dictator games’ in experimental economics) are 
included only when beneficiaries are strangers, and when participants consider the outcome of 
their decisions to be charitable donations. Studies in languages other than English are 
disregarded, although they were used to retrieve references to other studies with characteristics 
that fit our restrictions. Our search yielded only a few publications in languages other than 
English, notably Dutch, German, Italian, Spanish, and Polish. Most of the studies were conducted 
in the United States, followed by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada. This may be 
a source of bias; although it is unclear to what extent the bias is systematic.  
Unless otherwise noted, ‘giving’ refers to voluntary charitable donations by households or 
individuals to nonprofit organizations as reported in questionnaires or observed in experiments. 
Studies on donations to specific types of charitable organizations (e.g., religion, health, alumni 
donations) are included, but denoted as such. Unless otherwise noted, all studies are published in 
academic (but not necessarily peer-reviewed) journals, books or edited volumes. References to 
unpublished research were included only if the research was publicly available.  
In a literature survey like this, space constraints prohibit us to do justice to all the 
arguments, findings and methods of the studies reviewed. Also the reader should make her own 
judgement on the quality of the papers we reviewed. We have refrained from judgements on the 
quality of individual publications. In order to facilitate the reader’s own judgement on the quality 
of the work cited, we have constructed a database containing valuable information on the 
individual publications. Among others, this database includes the exact citation, the mechanism 
investigated, the discipline of publication (based on the journal and/or first author’s affiliation), 
and the methodology used (survey, experiment). Two criteria we believe increase research quality 
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are (1) when the research aims to explicitly test or measures mechanisms that can explain 
charitable giving, and (2) when more adequate statistical models are used. 
WHY DO PEOPLE GIVE? EIGHT MECHANISMS THAT DRIVE CHARITABLE 
GIVING 
Experiments in economics, sociology, social psychology, biology and marketing have 
shown how situations can be created that encourage giving. The situations in these experiments 
are created by researchers, which allows for causal inferences about determinants of giving. From 
these experiments, conclusions can be drawn about why people give. We reviewed this literature 
and identify eight mechanisms as the key mechanisms that have been studied as determinants of 
philanthropy. They are: (1) awareness of need; (2) solicitation; (3) costs and benefits; (4) 
altruism; (5) reputation; (6) psychological benefits; (7) values; (8) efficacy.  
Our categorization is a refinement and extension of previous categorizations that 
distinguished types of ‘costs and benefits’ associated with participation in voluntary 
organizations (Chinman, Wandersman, & Goodman, 2005; P. B. Clark & Wilson, 1961). In their 
theory of incentive systems in organizations, Clark and Wilson (1961) distinguished material 
benefits, solidary benefits and purposive benefits associated with participation in organizations. 
Charitable giving is a form of participation. Therefore the incentive theory should be applicable. 
Material benefits are tangible rewards that can be assigned a monetary value; solidary benefits are 
intangible social rewards, and purposive benefits are intangible benefits associated with the goals 
of an organization (Chinman, et al., 2005). However, the incentive theory also seems incomplete 
when applied to philanthropy. We have refined this typology to repair two specific drawbacks.  
The first drawback is that previous categorizations assume purposive actors who make 
deliberate choices if and to what extent they will participate, depending on the consequences of 
their participation actions. In this perspective, the actions of charitable organizations and 
beneficiaries are ignored. In many cases donors do not actively seek opportunities to donate, but 
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simply respond to the needs of beneficiaries and solicitations from charitable organizations. We 
distinguish these influences in separate mechanisms.  
The second drawback is that the types of categories are rather broad and 
multidimensional, covering qualitatively different processes that affect charitable giving. 
Purposive benefits, for instance, cover such different mechanisms such as altruism (benefits for 
beneficiaries), values (endorsement of the charity’s goals), personal satisfaction from 
contributing, and efficacy of contributions. We argue that it is more informative to distinguish 
these influences in separate mechanisms. 
Our categorization of mechanisms is based on differences in four dimensions (see table 1), 
that can be captured by the questions ‘What?’, ‘Where?’ and ‘Who?’. The first dimension is the 
‘what’, or the physical form of the mechanism. Is it a tangible object that can be touched? The 
second dimension is the ‘where’, or the location of the mechanism. Is it located within, outside, 
or between individuals? The third and fourth dimension constitute the ‘who’, or the parties 
involved. The third dimension is the actor in the mechanism. We distinguish beneficiaries, 
(charitable, nonprofit) organizations, donors, and alters (people in the social environments of 
donors). The fourth dimension is the target of the cause (who is affected). Targets may be donors 
or beneficiaries. 
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
 
Each of the mechanisms is a different combination of values on the four dimensions. 
Table 1 is not exhaustive because not all combinations occurred in the literature. The order in 
which the eight mechanisms are presented below does not reflect the importance or causal 
strength of the mechanisms. Rather, the order corresponds to the chronological order in which 
they affect giving in the typical act of donation. In doing so, we follow previous reviews of 
related literatures (Schroeder, et al., 1995; S. H. Schwartz, 1975; S. H. Schwartz & Howard, 
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1984), in which prosocial behavior and helping others are conceptualized as a series of 
consecutive decisions. For each mechanism, we present the main effect. In many cases, these 
main effects can be moderated (or sometimes mediated) by other factors. Moderating factors are 
factors that weaken or strengthen the effect of the mechanism: Conditions or personal 
characteristics that interact with the main effect. More information on factors moderating the 
mechanisms can be found in an appendix to this paper, available online. 
 
MECHANISM 1: AWARENESS OF NEED 
Awareness of need is a first prerequisite for philanthropy. People have to become aware 
of a need for support. In terms of the four dimensions in table 1, needs may be tangible as well as 
intangible (dimension 1: the ‘what’); needs reside within, between and outside people (dimension 
2: the ‘where’); needs originate from beneficiaries and organizations and target donors 
(dimensions 3 and 4: the ‘who’). People may have material needs for tangible objects outside 
themselves (e.g., food, shelter, security, medication, treatment), social needs (e.g., a need for 
company, which is something intangible that happens between people) or psychological needs 
(intangible phenomena within themselves: e.g., consolation). Awareness of need is a mechanism 
is largely beyond the control of donors, preceding the conscious deliberation of costs and benefits 
of donating. It is the result of actions of beneficiaries (who seek help) and charitable 
organizations (who communicate needs to potential donors).  
The effects of need have been documented mostly in social psychology, beginning with a 
series of field experiments from the mid 1960s onwards (Berkowitz, 1968; Berkowitz & Daniels, 
1964; S. H. Schwartz, 1975). In these experiments a variety of helping behaviors were studied, 
including practical assistance, blood donation, organ donation, as well as donating money. 
Generally speaking, the degree of need for help is positively related to the likelihood that help 
will be given (Levitt & Kornhaber, 1977; S. H. Schwartz, 1974; Staub & Baer, 1974). One study 
specifically tested for effects of need on donations (Wagner & Wheeler, 1969) and revealed that 
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not objective need but subjective perceptions of need are crucial. An experimental study tested 
for effects of watching a telethon and found a positive effect on attitudes toward disabled people, 
but not on donations (D. Feldman & Feldman, 1985). Survey studies reveal that more generous 
alumni perceive a higher need for contributions to their alma mater (W. D. Diamond & Kashyap, 
1997; Weerts & Ronca, 2007) and that volunteers perceive a higher need for volunteers in their 
community (Unger, 1991). A survey study on intentions to donate to international relief 
organizations also reveals a positive effect of need (Cheung & Chan, 2000). A survey study on 
donations to panhandlers shows that perceived need is positively related to donations (B. A. Lee 
& Farrell, 2003). 
Experiments usually manipulate need by exposing participants to needy victims. Knowing 
a victim, however, also promotes giving to other victims to whom the individual is not exposed 
directly (Small & Simonsohn, 2006). In focus groups, donors cite knowing a (potential) 
beneficiary as a motive for charitable contributions (Polonsky, Shelley, & Voola, 2002; Radley & 
Kennedy, 1995). Survey studies also suggest that awareness of need is increased when people 
know potential beneficiaries of a charitable organization. People who have relatives suffering 
from a specific illness are more likely to give to charities fighting those illnesses (Bekkers, 2008; 
Burgoyne, Young, & Walker, 2005), though they may not give more on average (V. H. Smith, 
Kehoe, & Cremer, 1995). A study in Norway showed that health charities fighting more common 
illnesses had higher numbers of members, and therefore received higher private contributions 
(Olsen & Eidem, 2003). People knowing a beneficiary of United Way funds are more likely to 
donate to United Way (Pitts & Skelly, 1984). People who have (had) ‘a deeply loved pet animal’ 
are more likely to prefer giving to animal welfare rather than other charitable causes (Bennett, 
2003).  
Awareness of need may also be increased by solicitors for charitable contributions 
informing potential donors about the needs of victims. One experimental study found that this 
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technique increases the likelihood of making donations, but yields lower contributions among 
those making a donation (Dolinski, Grzyb, Olejnik, Prusakowski, & Urban, 2005). 
Awareness of need is facilitated by the (mass) media. Simon (1997) shows that more 
extended media coverage of an earthquake has a strong positive relationship with private 
contributions supporting those affected. In turn, the amount of attention the media pays attention 
to beneficiaries’ needs depends on, among others, the number of beneficiaries (or those affected 
in the case of disasters), and the demographic and psychological distance between potential 
donors and beneficiaries (Adams, 1986; Simon, 1997). A survey study of donations to relief 
appeals – often advertised on television – reveals that the amount of time spent watching 
television is positively related to relief donations (Bennett & Kottasz, 2000).  
Early analyses of charitable donations reported on tax returns reveals that donations are 
higher in time periods (R. A. Schwartz, 1970) and states with more poverty (Abrams & Schmitz, 
1984; Amos, 1982), which suggests that donors respond to need with increased contributions. 
Recent studies (Bielefeld, Rooney, & Steinberg, 2005; Gittell & Tebaldi, 2006) do not uniformly 
support this conclusion. Schiff (1990) found that individuals in states with higher proportions of 
poor households give less to higher education and combined appeals, but more to lower 
education. Bielefeld, Rooney, & Steinberg (2005) found that donations to causes other than 
religion were higher in areas with higher levels of income inequality, allegedly because of a 
higher need for charitable contributions in these areas. 
It is likely that the awareness of need for support for a specific cause among the general 
public increases over time as charities working for the cause continue to exist. In a study of 
Spanish development aid organizations, it was found that older charities in the sector attracted 
more donations, because these organizations have a larger pool of volunteers available to them 
(Marcuello & Salas, 2000, 2001). A study from the U.K., however, found no effect of 
organizational age on private contributions to overseas charities (Khanna, Posnett, & Sandler, 
1995) though an effect of age on contributions to health, religion and social welfare organizations 
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was found. A later study, found no effect of organizational age (Khanna & Sandler, 2000). A first 
study in the U.S. found significant age effects on contributions received by organizations in the 
arts and culture sector, hospitals, and nonprofit organizations sponsoring scientific research 
(Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986). A later study, however, found negative effects of organizational 
age for higher education institutions and scientific research (Okten & Weisbrod, 2000). While a 
study from Canada found no effect of organizational age on contributions received by 
organizations (Callen, 1994), both a study from Singapore (Wong, Chua, & Vasoo, 1998), as well 
as a study from Norway found positive organizational age effects (Olsen & Eidem, 2003).  
 
MECHANISM 2: SOLICITATION 
A second mechanism that precedes the conscious deliberation of various types of costs 
and benefits of donating is solicitation. Solicitation refers to the mere act of being solicited to 
donate. The way potential donors are solicited determines the effectiveness of solicitations. The 
effects of different methods are captured by the other mechanisms. In terms of the four 
dimensions in table 1, solicitations (1) may be tangible (e.g., a fundraising letter) or intangible (a 
personal request); (2) are interactions between people; (3) originate from beneficiaries or 
charitable organizations; (4) target potential donors. Studies on solicitation have appeared in 
journals from a variety of disciplines, including marketing, psychology and economics.  
A large majority of all donation acts occurs in response to a solicitation. Bryant, 
Slaughter, Kang and Tax (2003) find that 85% of donation acts among respondents in the 1996 
Independent Sector survey on Giving and Volunteering in the preceding year are following a 
solicitation for a contribution. Bekkers (2005a) finds that 86% of the donation acts in two weeks 
preceding the 2002 Giving in the Netherlands Panel Survey are following a solicitation. The 
evidence from these cross-sectional studies that solicitations greatly enhance the likelihood of 
donations is complemented by the earlier experimental finding showing that actively soliciting 
contributions rather than passively presenting an opportunity to give increases the likelihood that 
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people donate (Lindskold, Forte, Haake, & Schmidt, 1977). The implication is that the more 
opportunities to give people encounter, the more likely they are to give. Survey studies in 
marketing and sociology usually find that receiving a higher number of solicitations for charitable 
contributions is associated with increased philanthropic activity (Bekkers, 2005a; B. A. Lee & 
Farrell, 2003; Schlegelmilch, Love, & Diamantopoulos, 1997; Simmons & Emanuele, 2004; 
Tiehen, 2001; Wiepking & Maas, 2009), although two studies did not find such an association 
(Marx, 2000; Sokolowski, 1996).  
This does not imply that fundraising organizations should mindlessly increase the number 
of individuals receiving their appeals. A survey study of alumni donations revealed that higher 
education institutions soliciting contributions from a larger proportion of their alumni receive 
lower average contributions (Leslie & Ramey, 1988). This finding may reflect strongly 
decreasing marginal utility of the number of persons solicited. In addition, charitable 
organizations should take care not to overburden their donors with solicitations. Increasing the 
number of solicitations may produce ‘donor fatigue’ and may lower the average contribution 
(Van Diepen, Donkers, & Franses, 2009; Wiepking, 2008b). Taking a life time value perspective, 
the number of solicitations may even be reduced by optimizing the search for more responsive 
targets (Piersma & Jonker, 2004). 
It is not surprising that larger donors receive more solicitations per year for charitable 
contributions (Bekkers, 2005a; Van Diepen, et al., 2009). This is not only because solicitations 
yield contributions, but also because responding to solicitations for contributions attracts new 
solicitations: ‘Once on the list of usual suspects, I’m likely to stay there’ (Putnam, 2000; Van 
Diepen, et al., 2009). Due to increasing numbers of solicitations for charitable contributions, the 
standard response is to reject an appeal, except for older people who tend to take appeal letters 
more serious and hence more often respond to them (W. D. Diamond & Noble, 2001). As a 
result, it is not surprising that small modifications of direct mail appeals do not easily affect 
giving (Katzev, 1995). Even in single encounters that are unlikely to result in a long term 
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involvement with a charity, people try to avoid being solicited for contributions (Pancer, 
McMullen, Kabatoff, Johnson, & Pond, 1979). 
 
MECHANISM 3: COSTS AND BENEFITS 
The third mechanism covers the material costs and benefits associated with donating. 
Adapting a definition from Clark & Wilson (1961) and Chinman, Wandersman & Goodman 
(2005), we define material costs and benefits as ‘tangible consequences that are associated with a 
monetary value’. In terms of the four dimensions in table 1, costs and benefits (1) are tangible 
objects; (2) reside outside donors; (3) originate from organizations; and (4) affect donors. Effects 
of costs and benefits are most often documented in studies in economics. 
 
COSTS 
It is clear that giving money costs money. When the costs of a donation are lowered, 
giving increases (Bekkers, 2005c; C. C. Eckel & Grossman, 2004; C. C. Eckel & Grossman, 
2003; Karlan & List, 2006). This is not only true for the absolute costs, but also for the perception 
of the costs of a donation (Wiepking & Breeze, 2009). This is not to say that philanthropy is 
motivated by material self-gain: because “donors will always be better off not making a 
donation” (Sargeant & Jay, 2004: 100). Studies of hypothetical giving also show that requests for 
larger donations are less likely to be honoured (Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Bekkers, 2004).  
Economists have studied the empirical effects of the price of giving on philanthropy using 
survey data and tax files in many papers since the 1970s. A large number of studies have 
estimated the effects of tax price on philanthropy.1 Reviews of these studies are given in 
Steinberg (1990), Simmons & Emanuele (2004), and Peloza and Steel (2005). The latter paper 
provides a meta-analysis, showing that estimates of the price effect are generally negative, but 
vary widely between studies, depending on the scope of the sample and the statistical methods 
used. More recent estimates of price effects, based on econometric models developed for the 
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analysis of panel data, tend to be lower than estimates from earlier studies (McClelland, 2002). 
The most recent study reached the conclusion that changes in the tax deduction for charitable 
contributions have a large, persistent price effect between -0.79 and -1.26 and a smaller transitory 
price effect between -0.40 and -0.61 (Auten, Sieg, & Clotfelter, 2002). The price effects appear to 
be larger for religious donations (Wiepking, 2007). Tax benefits seem the most important motive 
for payroll giving in the UK (Romney-Alexander, 2002). When employers match charitable 
contributions of their employees, they give more (Okunade & Berl, 1997). 
However, when the costs of donating are increased by increasing the amount requested, 
the amount donated may actually increase if the amount requested is not perceived as excessive 
(Doob & McLaughlin, 1989). However, one study found that a request for a ‘generous 
contribution’ rather than a specific amount decreases the likelihood that a gift will be made in 
door-to-door solicitations (Weyant & Smith, 1987). Desmet (1999) found a positive effect of 
asking for more on average donations in a direct mail campaign among irregular donors, but not 
among regular donors. In addition, higher donations were offset by a lower response rate. Similar 
findings are reported by Fraser, Hite and Sauer (1988). In another study, a higher reference point 
contribution increased the amount donated, but did not decrease the likelihood of making a 
contribution (Alpizar, Carlsson, & Johansson-Stenman, 2007). 
The costs of a donation sometimes involve more than just money. A survey study found 
that people who perceive fewer obstacles to give are more likely to give (J. R. Smith & 
McSweeney, 2007). Physical discomfort also discourages philanthropy. People are more likely to 
donate money to a charity when weather conditions are better. One study found a sizeable 
positive effect of temperature on giving to the Salvation Army in the period between 
Thanksgiving and Christmas (Jiobu & Knowles, 1974). However, an experimental study of 
donations in church found no effect of sunshine (Soetevent, 2005). Survey studies of the timing 
of donations in the United Kingdom (Banks & Tanner, 1999; Pharoah & Tanner, 1997) and 
Ireland (Carroll, McCarthy, & Newman, 2006) reveal that December is by far the most generous 
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month of the year. In the second quarter of the year U.K. households are more likely to give but 
do not give higher amounts (Pharoah & Tanner, 1997). 
 
BENEFITS 
Occasionally, donations to charitable organizations buy services or other ‘selective 
incentives’ (Olson, 1965). For instance, when donors to universities, museums or symphony 
orchestras get access to exclusive dinners, meetings or special concerts. These donations may be 
characterized as exchange, when they are rooted in part in consumption motives. Offering access 
to exclusive services in exchange for contributions brings giving closer to buying. The benefits 
mechanism is mostly studied by economists and marketing scientists. Studies on alumni giving 
show that alumni are more generous after graduation if their university spent more on them 
(Baade & Sundberg, 1996a, 1996b; Harrison, Mitchell, & Peterson, 1995). A study of donations 
to the opera found that fringe benefits increase contributions (Buraschi & Cornelli, 2002). When 
these fringe benefits are matched to selected categories of gifts, giving is pushed up even more 
(Andreoni & Petrie, 2004). Lotteries constitute another type of material benefits for donations, 
which increase the number of donors (but not the amount donated per donor) in fundraising 
campaigns (Landry, Lange, List, Price, & Rupp, 2006). Offering material benefits may also 
provide donors with an excuse for a donation in cases where they are otherwise withheld by a 
norm of self-interest (Miller, 1999). A survey study of charitable gifts and lotteries in Canada 
reveals that the two behaviors are complements, not substitutes (Apinunmahakul & Devlin, 
2004). Analysis of donations as reported on tax forms suggests that on the whole, philanthropic 
contributions seem to depend less strongly on direct benefits than on indirect benefits and value 
orientations (Amos, 1982). 
A popular belief among fundraisers is that including a gift in a direct-mail package 
increases donations. However, there is no strong foundation for this belief in the empirical studies 
we reviewed. We found four papers testing whether a gift increases donations (Alpizar, et al., 
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2007; Chen, Li, & MacKie-Mason, 2006; Edlund, Sagarin, & Johnson, 2007; Harris, Liguori, & 
Stack, 1973), with different results. Alpizar et al. (2007) find that gifts increase the likelihood of 
contributions to a natural park in Costa Rica. However, the gift reduced the amount contributed 
among donors. Edlund, Sagarin and Johnson (2007) found that participants who were offered a 
bottle of water purchased more raffle tickets for an alumni association, especially those who had 
a stonger ‘belief in a just world’. Harris et al. (1973) conducted a series of three experiments 
offering a cookie to prospective donors, and found a positive effect of a gift in only one 
experiment. Chen et al. (2006) conducted an online fundraising campaign offering premiums 
(mouse pads, book lights and CD cases) but found no effect. 
Having profited personally from services from a nonprofit organization seems to enhance 
the probability of subsequent donations, although the evidence is rather thin (Marr, Mullin, & 
Siegfried, 2005; Schervish & Havens, 2002).  
The effect of benefits may partly explain why congregational giving declines when 
congregation size increases. In larger congregations the likelihood of having direct personal 
access to clergy is much lower (Davidson & Pyle, 1994; D. V. A. Olson & Caddell, 1994; 
Stonebraker, 2003; Sullivan, 1985; Zaleski & Zech, 1992, 1994; Zaleski, Zech, & Hoge, 1994). 
However, giving may also be lower in larger groups because of free rider-effects (Kropf & 
Knack, 2003; D. V. A. Olson & Caddell, 1994; M. Olson, 1965), because of a lower level of 
commitment to the group (Finke, Bahr, & Scheitle, 2006; Knoke, 1981), or because of a lower 
level of social pressure (see below). In Presbyterian churches, however, giving increases with 
congregation size (Lunn, Klay, & Douglass, 2001). Interestingly, the authors explained this 
finding as the result of ‘increased ministerial services’. 
There is a danger in offering material benefits for charitable contributions. When people 
receive material benefits for helpfulness, they tend to undermine self-attributions of helpfulness 
(Zuckerman, Lazzaro, & Waldgeir, 1979), which reduces the effect of prosocial self-attributions 
on future helpfulness. Fringe benefits change the decision into an exchange (do I get value for 
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money?). Gruber (2004) finds that subsidies for religious contributions reduce church attendance. 
Eckel and Grossman (2000) find that participants in a dictator game experiment who are recruited 
through flyers telling they could earn money are less generous and less strongly motivated by 
non-monetary factors than participants recruited in class. Meier (2007a) found that removing a 
subsidy for private contributions to a Swiss university fund reduced such contributions in 
consecutive years. This may be taken as evidence of a ‘crowding out’ effect of subsidies on 
intrinsic motivation. Not only the donor’s self-image may be affected by entering the domain of 
exchange, also the nonprofit organization’s image. Charities offering products for sale in 
catalogues face lower contributions (Desmet, 1998). 
In many cases, charitable donations do not provide immediate material benefits to oneself, 
but do provide benefits to individuals known to the donor or a group of which the donor is a 
member (Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2005; Schervish & Havens, 2002; Tam Cho, 2002). Examples 
are donations to the local hospital and one’s church. Such contributions can be explained as a 
form of generalized exchange. In addition, if the contributions are made (in) public, they will be 
recognized by fellow community members, and may be explained by reference to the mechanism 
of reputation discussed below. Finally, individuals may perceive their donations as fair 
contributions that will maintain services that they may use at some later point in time. For 
instance, donors may perceive donations to medical research as a means of relieving their own 
future health needs (Burgoyne, et al., 2005). 
 
MECHANISM 4: ALTRUISM 
An obvious reason why individuals may contribute money to charities is because they 
care about the organization’s output, or the consequences of donations for beneficiaries. 
Economists, who dominate the study of this mechanism, have labelled this motive ‘altruism’ 
(Andreoni, 2006). In terms of the four dimensions in table 1, (1) altruism yields consequences 
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that are tangible; (2) that reside outside individuals; (3) that originate from donors, are often 
channelled through charitable organizations; and (4) accrue solely to beneficiaries. 
Purely altruistic motivation (in the economic sense) would lead individuals who learn 
about an increase in contributions by others with $1 to reduce their own contribution with $1. 
This is called a ‘crowding out’ effect. Numerous studies in economics have sought to estimate the 
magnitude of crowding out; a landmark study is that of Kingma (1989). Results of empirical 
studies testing for crowding out effects show that crowding out may exist, but is often less than 
perfect: a $1 dollar increase in governmental spending decreases private giving with less than $1. 
Some studies find no crowding out effect at all (Brooks, 1999; Kropf & Knack, 2003; Marcuello 
& Salas, 2001; Reece, 1979) and some studies even find crowding in-effects (Brooks, 2003b; A. 
M. Diamond, 1999; Hughes & Luksetich, 1999; Khanna, et al., 1995; Khanna & Sandler, 2000; 
Okten & Weisbrod, 2000; Schiff, 1985, 1990). One study found that increased government 
support was correlated with a higher number of donors but with lower average private 
contributions (Brooks, 2003a).  
Theoretically, the often less than perfect crowding out implies that other and perhaps more 
powerful things besides altruism motivate donations. From the behaviour of donors we can infer 
that they do not care so much about the public benefits generated by that their contributions. The 
private benefits, or selective incentives (M. Olson, 1965) for contributions dominate altruistic 
motives. Hence, donors may be called ‘impure altruists’ (Andreoni, 1989, 1990; Kingma, 1989). 
In practice, the findings imply that “a severe cut in government funding to non-profit 
organizations is not likely, on average, to be made up by donations from private donors” (Payne, 
1998: 338). 
 
MECHANISM 5: REPUTATION 
The mechanism of reputation refers to the social consequences of donations for the donor. 
In terms of table 1, these consequences are intangible phenomena that happen between 
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individuals: people in the social environment of donors verbally or non-verbally reward donors 
for giving, or punish them for not giving. Reputation is studied most often in psychology and 
economics, together accounting for about two thirds of the studies on this mechanism. 
Giving is usually viewed as a positive thing to do (CAF, 2005; Horne, 2003; Muehleman, 
Bruker, & Ingram, 1976), especially when giving reduces inequality (Brickman & Bryan, 1975), 
and when giving is less costly, beneficiaries are not to blame, and is more effective (Horne, 
2003). Thus, people who give to charitable causes are held in high regard by their peers 
(Muehleman, et al., 1976; Wiepking, 2008a). They receive recognition and approval from others. 
Laboratory experiments with abstract public goods games by economists and social-psychologists 
reveal that individuals are willing to incur costs to recognize generous contributions (J. Clark, 
2002). Conversely, not giving damages ones reputation. This is especially true when donations 
are announced in public or when they are directly observable (Alpizar, et al., 2007; Barclay, 
2004; Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006; Bereczkei, Birkas, & Kerekes, 2007; Harris, Benson, & 
Hall, 1975; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996; S. H. Long, 1976; Satow, 1975; Soetevent, 2005). 
When given the choice, people generally prefer their donations to be known by others (Andreoni 
& Petrie, 2004). Thus, face-to-face solicitations are more effective than solicitations made over 
the telephone (Brockner, Guzzi, Kane, Levine, & Shaplen, 1984), and giving people the option of 
donating money in an envelope rather than having them hand over the money reduces donations 
(Hoffman, et al., 1996; Thornton, Kirchner, & Jacobs, 1991). Gaining reputation for donations 
has been facilitated recently with the advent of ribbons (e.g., pink) and wristbands (e.g., yellow); 
a practice conceptualised as ‘conspicious compassion’ (Grace & Griffin, 2006; West, 2004) with 
an eye to the classic study of Veblen (1899).  
To some extent, the effect of being watched may be physical in nature. One study found 
that solicitors in a door-to-door fundraising campaign who looked potential donors in the eye 
raised more money than solicitors who looked at the collecting tin (Bull & Gibson-Robinson, 
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1981). Cues of being watched need not even be consciously perceived: stylized eyes spots also 
have a positive effect on donations (Haley & Fessler, 2005). 
Recognition may be given by persons who are not physically present. Merely knowing 
that one’s contribution is perceived by others may be enough to motivate people to give. In a 
study determining factors that influence giving during a telethon, Silverman et al. (1984) found 
that viewers were most likely to give at the times when the names of pledging donors were shown 
on the screen. Because larger groups are often more anonymous, it may be that incidence and 
level of donations decrease when group sizes increases in bars and school classes (Wiesenthal, 
Austrom, & Silverman, 1983). Survey studies by sociologists and scholars studying religion have 
consistently found a negative relation between the size of congregations and religious 
contributions (Davidson & Pyle, 1994; Hungerman, 2005; D. V. A. Olson & Caddell, 1994; 
Stonebraker, 2003; Zaleski & Zech, 1994; Zaleski, et al., 1994). While donors often deny the 
importance of social pressure (Polonsky, et al., 2002), survey studies have found that donations 
are rather strongly related to measures of social pressure (Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008; Mathur, 1996; 
Pitts & Skelly, 1984; J. R. Smith & McSweeney, 2007). Also the finding by Clotfelter (2003) that 
those who are still related to former alumni tend to give more to private colleges and universities 
may be explained by the mechanism of reputation. 
 
MECHANISM 6: PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFITS 
Giving not only yields social benefits, but also psychological benefits for the donor. In 
terms of table 1, the mechanism of psychological benefits refers to the intangible benefits that 
donors bestow upon themselves as a result of donating, and to the intangible costs that donors 
avoid by donating. A large majority of all studies on this mechanism is conducted by (social) 
psychologists, who have shown that giving may contribute to one’s self-image as an altruistic, 
empathic, socially responsible, agreeable, or influential person. In addition, giving is in many 
cases an almost automatic emotional response, producing a positive mood, alleviating feelings of 
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guilt, reducing aversive arousal, satisfying a desire to show gratitude, or to be a morally just 
person. 
 
THE ‘JOY OF GIVING’ 
There is ample evidence from studies on helping behaviour that helping others produces 
positive psychological consequences for the helper, sometimes labelled ‘empathic joy’ (Batson & 
Shaw, 1991). In economic models of philanthropy, this category of motives is labelled ‘warm 
glow’ or ‘joy of giving’ (Andreoni, 1989). Recent evidence from neuropsychological studies 
suggests that donations to charity “elicit neural activity in areas linked to reward processing” 
(Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007) and “anterior sectors of the prefrontal cortex are 
distinctively recruited when altruistic choices prevail over selfish material interests” (Moll et al., 
2006). There are several reasons why humans may have pleasurable psychological experiences 
upon giving: people may alleviate feelings of guilt (avoid punishment), feel good for acting in 
line with a social norm, or feel good for acting in line with a specific (prosocial, altruistic) self-
image. Behavioral brain studies suggest these experiences require a relatively low level of 
perceptual processing (Tankersley, Stowe, & Huettel, 2007). 
The joy of giving (relative to keeping money for oneself) can be manipulated by benign 
thoughts. People are more generous after they have spent some time thinking about their own 
death (Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002), about an act of forgiveness 
(Karremans, Lange, & Holland, 2005), or about things in life for which they are grateful 
(Soetevent, 2005). 
Positive moods in general may motivate giving. Strahilevitz and Myers (1998) found that 
people are more likely to choose a charity donation over a discount when buying frivolous 
products (e.g., Sundae, frozen yoghurt) rather than functional products (e.g. backpack, 
toothpaste). A positive mood may also be induced by the question ‘how do you feel today?’. 
Most people answer positively to this question (‘I’m fine, thank you’) and are subsequently more 
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likely to comply with a request for a donation. This is called the ‘foot-in-the-mouth effect’  (Aune 
& Basil, 1994; Dolinski, et al., 2005; Howard, 1990). It may also be that the ‘foot-in-the-mouth 
effect’ works not so much because it brings about a positive mood but because it creates 
relational obligations (Dolinski, et al., 2005). 
The advice to fundraisers is to test fundraising materials for their mood effects, and to 
avoid the use of materials that bring about a negative mood. Simply telling prospective donors 
that donating will bring them in a good mood increases giving, especially when victims are 
depicted as innocent (Benson & Catt, 1978). Donors also self-report ‘feeling good’ as a motive 
for donating to charitable causes (57% of a sample of Dutch citizens in Wunderink, 2000). 
In specific circumstances, negative moods can also encourage giving. Cunningham et al. 
(1980) show that people in a good mood respond better to rewards associated with giving (a 
warm-glow feeling, or a present), and that people in a bad mood are more responsive towards 
avoiding punishments that come with not giving (for example the phrase: “Image how you would 
feel not helping”).   
 
SELF-IMAGE 
When giving entails positive psychological benefits, people are said to have positive 
personal norms (R. A. Schwartz, 1970). Personal norms strengthen the effect of social norms. 
When the social norm is to give, those who feel bad about themselves for violating the norm are 
more likely to give. Not giving would entail feelings of guilt, shame, or dissonance with one’s 
self-image. Experiments on helping behavior show that assisting others may be an effective way 
of repairing one’s self-image after one has harmed another (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Freedman, 
Wallington, & Bless, 1967; Konečki, 1972; Regan, Williams, & Sparling, 1972).  
One study tested the guilt hypothesis by comparing donations among people entering a 
church during confession hours and people leaving church after confession, when their guilt had 
been reduced (Harris, Benson, and Hall, 1975). Consistent with the guilt hypothesis, the former 
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group donated more often than the latter. While the higher likelihood of obtaining social approval 
among coreligionists for donations may also explain this difference, another more recent study 
confirms that feelings of guilt promote donations (Basil, Ridgway, & Basil, 2006). The study also 
showed that feelings of guilt lead to giving by enhancing feelings of responsibility. 
Survey studies have also provided evidence of a link between an altruistic self-image and 
philanthropy. Many studies find that dispositional empathy (measured with items like “I am a 
soft-hearted person”) is positively related to charitable giving (Bekkers, 2006b; Bennett, 2003; 
Davis, 1983; Piferi, Jobe, & Jones, 2006; Wilhelm & Bekkers, 2010). One study that asked 
individuals whether they would be more or less generous than average found that donors 
considered themselves more generous than non-donors (Schlegelmilch, Diamantopoulos, & Love, 
1997). However, giving is not only the result of an altruistic self-image, but also reinforces such 
an image. Piliavin and Callero (1991) found that blood donors develop an altruistic self-identity 
as a result of continued blood donation. A similar process is likely to exist for the donation of 
money to charitable causes (L. Lee, Piliavin, & Call, 1999). It is likely that such a reciprocal 
relationship between giving and altruistic self-image also exists for traditional philanthropy, 
although Sokolowski (1996) did not find evidence for this assumption using cross-sectional data. 
Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, and Bartels (2007) find that empathy mediates a 
negative effect of social exclusion on charitable giving. People feeling socially excluded 
temporally lack the ability to experience empathic concern, decreasing the incidence and level of 
charitable giving. 
The self-image mechanism can be used by charities in fundraising campaigns. 
Experimental field studies with adults have found that labelling potential helpers as ‘helpers’ 
promotes helping behaviour. Kraut (1973) found that if a canvasser labelled donors to one charity 
as “charitable” but did not make such a comment to other donors, a consecutive fundraising 
campaign was more successful among those who had been labelled charitable. Swinyard and Ray 
(1979) also found a positive labelling effect. A self-image of being helpful can also be created by 
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the ‘foot-in-the-door technique’. The technique includes making a small request before a larger 
request is made. Compliance with the first request makes people feel helpful, which creates a 
pressure to comply with the second, larger request (Freedman & Fraser, 1996; Rittle, 1981). 
The promise elicitation technique (Cialdini, 2001, p. 62) is another method to take 
advantage of the desire of people to behave in a manner consistent with their self-image. People 
tend to regard themselves as more generous than their peers (Muehleman, et al., 1976; Pronin, 
Lin, & Ross, 2002) and tend to overestimate their generosity in hypothetical (Bekkers, 2006a) 
and real life situations (Komter, 1996). When they are first asked their intentions to give, they are 
more likely to give in real life because people want to live up to their self-image. 
Kerr et al. (1997) found that commitment to a promise made to unknown others motivated 
contributions in an experimental game situation. Not contributing would create cognitive 
dissonance, feelings of guilt. Donors anticipate feelings of guilt upon reducing their current level 
of giving. Sargeant and Woodliffe (2005) found that committed donors perceived that ‘there 
would be a consequence for the beneficiary group of their withdrawing their support’. Another 
survey study found that respondents who anticipated feeling guilty for not giving were more 
likely to give (J. R. Smith & McSweeney, 2007). 
While the majority of studies on self-image have focused on altruism or helpfulness, other 
types of self-images may promote giving as well. For instance, giving enhances one’s self esteem 
(Ickes, Kidd, & Berkowitz, 1976). People may be motivated to give to enhance their self esteem. 
A survey study in the U.K. found that individuals who report a stronger sense of accomplishment 
are more likely to donate (Sargeant, Ford, & West, 2000). A survey study in New Zealand found 
that individuals with a more active orientation to life are more likely to donate (Todd & Lawson, 
1999). A similar finding emerges from a survey study in the Netherlands, in which more 
extraverted individuals – commonly described as more active and outgoing – are more likely to 
give and give higher amounts (Bekkers, 2006b). One study did not find an association between 
‘empowerment’ and giving to human services (Marx, 2000). Another survey study found that 
 26
esteem-enhancing motivations among older adults were negatively correlated with giving 
(Mathur, 1996).  
 
MECHANISM 7: VALUES 
In the eyes of donors, the works of nonprofit organizations may make the world a better 
place. Attitudes and values endorsed by donors make charitable giving more or less attractive to 
donors. Donations can also be instrumental to exemplifying one’s endorsement of specific values 
to others, but this is captured by the mechanism of reputation. In terms of table 1, values are 
intangible phenomena located within individuals, originating from donors, and targeted at 
themselves as well as beneficiaries. Studies on the effects of values are most often published by 
journals in sociology, psychology and philanthropic studies.  
Endorsement of prosocial values generally has a positive association with charitable 
giving. Because values are difficult if not impossible to manipulate, experimental studies on the 
effects of social values on philanthropy are non-existent. Some experimental studies link survey 
measures of attitudes and values to donations: humanitarianism and egalitarianism (Fong, 2007); 
and prosocial value orientations (Van Lange, Van Vugt, Bekkers, & Schuyt, 2007). Survey 
studies, mostly conducted by sociologists and marketing scientists, show that people who have 
altruistic values (Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008; Farmer & Fedor, 2001), who have prosocial values 
(Bekkers, 2006b, 2007; Van Lange, et al., 2007), who are less materialistic in general (Sargeant, 
et al., 2000), who endorse postmaterialistic goals in politics (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2006), who 
value being devout and spiritual (Todd & Lawson, 1999), who endorse a moral principle of care 
(Schervish & Havens, 2002; Wilhelm & Bekkers, 2010), who care about social order, consensus, 
and social justice in society (Todd & Lawson, 1999), who feel socially responsible for the 
recipient organization (Weerts & Ronca, 2007) and society as a whole (Amato, 1985; Reed & 
Selbee, 2002; Schuyt, Smit, & Bekkers, 2010) are more likely to give because they are motivated 
to make the world a better place.  
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Not only do some social values promote donations in general, but also do specific social 
values promote donations to particular charities (Wiepking, 2009). Philanthropy is a means to 
reach a desired state of affairs that is closer to one’s view of the ‘ideal’ world. What that ideal 
world looks like depends on one’s value system. Through giving, donors may wish to make the 
distribution of wealth and health more equal; they may wish to reduce poverty, empower women, 
safeguard human rights, to protect animals, wildlife, or the ozone layer. Donors may also have 
objectives that are partisan or even terrorist. Supporting a cause that changes the world in a 
desired direction is a key motive for giving that has received very little attention in the literature. 
The desire for social justice is most often studied in relation to philanthropy (Furnham, 1995; 
Todd & Lawson, 1999). Bennett (2003) studied the relationship between personal values and the 
choice of charitable organizations and found that a similarity between personal values and 
organizational values increases the probability that a donation to that particular organization is 
made. Keyt, Yavas and Riecken (2002) found that donors to the American Lung Association are 
more concerned about health issues than non-donors. In addition, donors to political parties 
endorse values central to the ideology of those parties (Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell, & 
Wilcox, 2005). 
 
MECHANISM 8: EFFICACY 
Efficacy refers to the perception of donors that their contribution makes a difference to the 
cause they are supporting. In terms of the four dimensions in table 1, efficacy perceptions are 
intangible (psychological) consequences of donations for donors, generated by charitable 
organizations. Efficacy is most often studied in philanthropic studies, economics, and 
psychology, respectively. 
Survey studies reveal that when people perceive that their contribution will not make a 
difference, they are less likely to give (Arumi et al., 2005; W. D. Diamond & Kashyap, 1997; 
Duncan, 2004; Mathur, 1996; Radley & Kennedy, 1992; J. R. Smith & McSweeney, 2007) or 
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leave a charitable bequest (Wiepking, Madden, & McDonald, 2010). These findings may be the 
result of reverse causality and/or justification. 
While efficacy has been studied extensively in the helping behaviour literature, we have 
been unable to locate any experimental studies on philanthropy that manipulated efficacy. 
Experiments with public goods games have found that contributions to public goods increase 
with the perceived efficacy of contributions (Sweeney, 1973). Three experimental studies tested 
the effect of providing donors with information about the effectiveness of contributions and 
found positive effects on philanthropy (N. C. Jackson & Mathews, 1995; Parsons, 2003, 2007). It 
appears that financial information is especially influential among committed donors (Parsons, 
2007). Studies of aggregate donations at the state level, however, do not find a consistently 
positive effect of the level of accountability of charitable organizations required in a state 
(Berman & Davidson, 2003; Irvin, 2005). Studies of private contributions received by nonprofit 
organizations in Canada and the U.S. find that organizational efficiency are positively related to 
private donations (Callen, 1994; Trussell & Parsons, 2007). 
People generally overestimate the effectiveness of their own contributions (Kerr, 1989). In 
their study of opera donations, Buraschi and Cornelli (2002) found that this holds especially for 
low-income donors. There appear to be individual differences in the tendency to view 
contributing to public goods in a rational manner. People who do so follow the free rider-
reasoning (Olson, 1965): an additional dollar does not solve the problem; not giving does not 
make things worse. Survey studies reveal that a more coldly rational approach to life reduces 
giving (Bekkers, 2006b; Todd & Lawson, 1999) and is related to a lower level of volunteering 
(Bekkers, 2005b; Unger, 1991). 
Perceived efficacy is a likely explanation for the effects of leadership donations and seed 
money that have been studied extensively by economists (Andreoni & Petrie, 2004; Bac & Bag, 
2003; Chen, et al., 2006; Landry, et al., 2006; List & Lucking-Reiley, 2002; List & Rondeau, 
2003; Potters, Sefton, & Vesterlund, 2005). When people see that others give to a charity, they 
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can take this as a signal that others have confidence in the organization. The leadership effect was 
described earlier by social psychologists as a ‘modeling effect’ (Bryan & Test, 1967; Lincoln, 
1977; Reingen, 1982). Lincoln (1977) found that observing another person make a donation 
increased subsequent donations, especially if the model was a male. Jiobu and Knowles (1974) 
however, found no modelling effect. A matching offer by a third party (e.g., one’s employer) can 
also have a legitimizing effect: people will think that the third party had enough confidence in the 
organization to offer the matching contribution. Endorsement of a charity by a high status person 
is also likely to generate higher donations through a legitimisation effect. One field experiment 
with a health charity (Vriens, Scheer, Hoekstra, & Bult, 1998) found that a signature by a 
professor in health care research raised donations with 2.4%. A lab experiment found that 
observing high status individuals making donations lead others to increase their donations, while 
the leadership effect was not found when low status individuals were observed making 
contributions (Kumru & Vesterlund, 2005).  
Surveys reveal that donors have an aversion against expensive fundraising methods 
(Arumi, et al., 2005; Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2005; Schervish & Havens, 2002). Evidence from 
the U.K. (Sargeant, et al., 2000) and the Netherlands (Bekkers, 2003) suggests that donors 
overestimate fundraising costs of charitable organizations. An experiment revealed that donors 
react less positively to ‘flashy’ fundraising materials (Bekkers & Crutzen, 2007). Low perceived 
efficacy decreases giving more strongly among altruistically motivated donors (Bekkers, 2006a). 
Perceptions of efficacy are related to charitable confidence and perceptions of overhead 
and fundraising costs. Donors who have more confidence in charitable organizations think their 
contributions are less likely to be spent on fundraising costs and overhead (Bekkers, 2006a; 
Sargeant, Ford, & West, 2006). Such beliefs about the efficacy of charitable organizations are 
likely to promote giving (Bekkers, 2006a; Bennett, 2003; Bennett & Gabriel, 2003; Bowman, 
2006; Keyt, et al., 2002; Parsons, 2003; Sargeant, et al., 2006; Schervish & Havens, 2002; 
Schlegelmilch, Diamantopoulos, et al., 1997; Yavas, Riecken, & Parameswaran, 1981). Wiepking 
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(2009) finds that confidence in charitable organizations specifically increases the likelihood of 
giving to organizations with an international focus, she finds no relationship between confidence 
and making donations to other types of organizations. Survey studies by Sargeant and colleagues 
reveal that the relationship of confidence with giving is mediated by relationship commitment 
(Sargeant, et al., 2006; Sargeant & Lee, 2004).  
While attractive design of fundraising materials is often believed to attract the attention of 
donors (W. D. Diamond & Gooding-Williams, 2002), field experiments tell a different story. 
Warwick (2001) reports 23 tests of design elements on outer envelopes used in donor acquisition 
mailings, and found no effect in 19 cases, a negative effect in three cases, and a positive effect in 
only one case. In a field experiment with direct-mail letters for a health charity, the optimal 
fundraising letter was found to contain no ‘amplifiers’ (like bold printing), and no illustration 
(Vriens, et al., 1998). In a field experiment with donations in a campaign for refugees in Ruanda, 
Bekkers and Crutzen (2007) found that a plain envelope raised more money than an envelope 
including a picture of the beneficiaries.  
 
HOW DO THE MECHANISMS RELATE TO EACH OTHER? 
The relative influence of each of the eight mechanisms – whether donations are primarily 
made in response to awareness of need, solicitation, costs and benefits, altruism, reputation 
concerns, psychological rewards, or efficacy – is unclear. Multiple motives are likely to operate 
simultaneously (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Clotfelter, 1997) and the mix of these motives differs 
over time, place, organizations, and donors. It is also likely that the eight mechanisms have 
interactive effects (e.g., that awareness of need may promote giving more strongly when efficacy 
is high). We think that identifying systematic patterns in the mix of the mechanisms and 
interactions among them are important tasks for future research.  
Throughout our review, we have distinguished experimental from survey studies. Each of 
these methods has its own advantages and disadvantages. Experiments typically test for short-
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term effects of manipulations, create artificial conditions, and rely on small groups of participants 
(university students). Strictly speaking, results cannot be generalized to the general population. 
The advantage of experimental control is the potential to draw causal inferences. Survey studies 
typically investigate donations over a longer period to real organizations among population 
samples, but cannot be used to infer causation.  
Much would be gained by combining the strengths of the two methods. However, due to 
specialization of scholars in disciplines with different methodological preferences, there are 
virtually no studies combining survey and experimental methods (an exception  is Bekkers, 
2007). We hope that with this review researchers using either method will become more aware of 
the insights gained in studies using the other method. In particular, insights from experimental 
studies illuminate results from survey studies. We illustrate this with a discussion of the influence 
of religion on philanthropy. What mechanisms may explain this relation? Scholars often 
distinguish ‘conviction’ and ‘community’ or ‘norms’ and ‘networks’ as two broad explanations 
(Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008; E. F. Jackson, Bachmeier, Wood, & Craft, 1995; Wuthnow, 1991). 
‘Conviction’ refers to (religious) beliefs, values and attitudes that encourage altruism; 
‘community’ refers to identification with the religious community, social pressure, and 
solicitations for contributions. The ‘conviction’ explanation pulls together three mechanisms: 
altruism (a real concern for others), psychological benefits (earning one’s place in heaven), and 
values (the importance of helping others). ‘Community’ pulls together solicitation (receiving 
requests for contributions), reputation (recognition from others) and psychological benefits 
(feeling part of a community). 
 
A CASE FOR PROGRESS? 
If the studies discussed above are viewed in a chronological order, do we then see any 
evidence for theoretical progress in the study of philanthropy? Taken together, theoretical 
progress in the literature on philanthropy is limited. The majority of papers we reviewed are not 
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based on solid theoretical foundations. This is not to say that there is no progress at all; 
subsequent studies may build on theoretical arguments without making them explicit. If the 
implicit hypotheses are reconstructed, we may detect progress. We do not make this exercise here 
because it is not the purpose of the present paper. Instead, we will indicate groups of studies in 
which we discern theoretical progress. 
A set of papers published in social psychology from the 1970s to mid 1980s, may be 
characterized as applied research testing for boundary conditions of fundamental mechanisms. 
While the insights from these studies may be reconstructed as refinements of general hypotheses, 
the studies themselves often do not state these hypotheses explicitly.  
Another set of papers, published in economics, does have more solid theoretical 
foundations. Model building in economics started with the public good model, but when no or 
little crowding out was observed in empirical studies, the model was found too crude. 
Subsequently, impure altruism models were proposed (Andreoni, 1989, 1990), collapsing all non-
altruistic motives in one parameter. The revision of the model in subsequent studies as a result of 
empirical disconfirmation is a clear example of theoretical progress. 
Other formal models of philanthropy deal with only one mechanism. Glazer and Konrad 
(1986) have modelled the reputation mechanism in a mathematical form. They call their model a 
signalling explanation for charity. By giving, people signal to others that they are concerned 
about others and/or that they have wealth (Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1996). Both signals buy 
prestige (Harbaugh, 1998). Duncan’s model of impact philanthropy focuses on the desire of 
donors to have impact on beneficiaries (Duncan, 2004). The model accurately describes one 
specific ingredient of the ‘warm glow’. As far as we know, there are no theoretical models 
describing the mechanisms of solicitation, psychological rewards, values, and efficacy.  
Philanthropic acts are commonly the result of multiple mechanisms working at once. 
However, formal models of philanthropy (e.g., Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002) have focussed on only 
one or sometimes two motives. More than ten years ago, Brown (1997, 183) described the state 
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of affairs with regard to theory as follows: “No single model captures all the motivations that 
underlie charitable action”. While it is probably impossible to capture all mechanisms in one 
elegant formal model, Brown’s assessment still holds and provides a challenge for model 
builders. 
There is a large potential for theoretical progress in the literature on philanthropy. The 
challenge for all scholars, model builders and other scientists alike, is to test competing 
alternative explanations – potentially from different disciplines – against each other. Scholars 
trying to prove their pet theories do not add much to our understanding of philanthropy. Progress 
is hindered by the lack of awareness of research in distant times and disciplines. Hopefully this 




1 See (Abrams & Schmitz, 1978, 1984; Andreoni, 1993; Andreoni & Payne, 2003; Auten, Cilke, 
& Randolph, 1992; Auten, et al., 2002; Barrett, 1991; Barrett, McGuirk, & Steinberg, 1997; 
Boskin & Feldstein, 1977; Brooks, 2003b; Brown, 1997; Brown & Lankford, 1992; Choe & 
Jeong, 1993; Chua & Wong, 1999; Daneshvary & Luksetich, 1997; Duncan, 2004; Eaton, 2001; 
Feenberg, 1987; N. E. Feldman, 2007; Feldstein, 1975a, 1975b; Feldstein & Taylor, 1976; 
Glenday, Gupta, & Pawlak, 1986; Greenwood, 1993; Hood, Martin, & Osberg, 1977; Jones & 
Posnett, 1991a, 1991b; Khanna, et al., 1995; Khanna & Sandler, 2000; Kingma, 1989; Lankford 
& Wyckoff, 1991; J. E. Long, 2000; McClelland & Kokoski, 1994; O'Neill, Steinberg, & 
Thompson, 1996; Park & Park, 2004; Randoph, 1995; Reece, 1979; Reece & Zieschang, 1985, 
1989; Ricketts & Westfall, 1993; Robinson, 1990; Schiff, 1985, 1990; Simmons & Emanuele, 
2004; Slemrod, 1989; Richard S. Steinberg, 1985, 1991; Taussig, 1967). 
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Table 1. Overview of mechanisms 
 
Mechanism What? Where? Who? 













2. Solicitation Tangible and 
intangible 
Between Beneficiaries and 
organizations 
Donors 
3. Costs/benefits  Tangible Outside Organizations Donors 
4. Altruism Tangible Outside Donors and 
Organizations 
Beneficiaries 
5. Reputation Intangible Between Alters Donors 
6. Psychological 
costs and benefits 
Intangible Within Donors Donors 
7. Values Intangible Within Donors Donors and 
beneficiaries 





APPENDIX: MODERATING FACTORS 
 
In the literature review we have described eight mechanisms that drive charitable giving. This 
appendix describes factors moderating the effects of the mechanisms. Moderators are factors 
that weaken the effect of the mechanism (negative moderators) or strengthen the effect 
(positive moderator). Moderators may be other mechanisms, situational conditions or personal 
characteristics. 
 
Mechanism 1: Awareness of need 
Moderators of the effect of need include other mechanisms: costs, reputation, 
psychological benefits and efficacy; situational conditions: dependence of the beneficiary on 
the donor; and personal characteristics: perceptions of deservingness; acceptance (vs. denial) 
of responsibility, mood religiosity, and political orientation. 
Costs. Material costs moderate the effect of need. When a larger need implies a higher 
cost, it does not increase helping behaviour (Piliavin & Piliavin, 1972). 
Reputation. An experiment on volunteering revealed that the opportunity to gain social 
approval for helping promotes the effect of need (Fisher & Ackerman, 1998). 
Psychological benefits. Awareness of need has little effect if potential donors face 
psychological costs when confronted with the need. In an early study, a picture of a needy, 
handicapped child was found to depress giving in a door-to-door fundraising campaign 
presumably because it depressed the mood of potential donors (Isen & Noonberg, 1979). 
Dyck and Coldevin (1992) came to the same conclusion in an experiment testing the effect of 
no photo, a positive and a negative photograph in appeal letters. The picture with “a less 
pleasant, needy ‘negative’ photograph” yielded lowest response rates and contributions. 
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Efficacy. The display of need may backfire when the need is perceived as impossible 
to solve (Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007; for further evidence on the interaction with 
efficacy, see below; Warren & Walker, 1991) or when a picture displaying needy recipients 
depresses the potential helper (Isen & Noonberg, 1979). In face-to-face solicitations, a picture 
to illustrate need may make no difference at all (Thornton, Kirchner, & Jacobs, 1991). Finally, 
West and Brown (1975) found in an experiment with helping behaviour that severity of need 
did result in more giving when the victim was more attractive.  
Dependence. Berkowitz (1968) found that need produces helping only when the 
beneficiary is dependent on help from the donor. In addition, social class differences were 
found. Working class boys tended to react to need only when they had received help earlier, 
especially from the same person. Middle class boys were not affected by help received. Thus, 
when victims are dependent upon potential helpers and these helpers adhere to a moral 
principle of care, need produces helping. 
Perceptions of deservingness and acceptance of responsibility. Whether beneficiaries 
are perceived as deserving also moderates the effect of need (Miller, 1977). When victims are 
perceived as causes of their own misfortune, potential donors may deny their responsibility 
for relieving the needs of the victim (Furnham, 1995). E.g., people are less prepared to 
sponsor welfare recipients when they know the recipients are unwilling to engage in paid 
work (Fong, 2007). Refusals to give to the homeless are often explained in these terms 
(Radley & Kennedy, 1992), as are refusals to give to poverty relief in developing countries 
(Bennett & Kottasz, 2000; Taormina, Messick, Iwawaki, & Wilke, 1988). Denial of 
responsibility is less likely to occur when the fate of victims is perceived as beyond people’s 
control (Lerner & Simmons, 1966), at least among politically liberal individuals (Skitka, 
Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002). Survey data reveal that awareness of need 
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is not associated with giving when potential donors attribute responsibility to government 
(Eschholz & Van Slyke, 2002; Polonsky, Shelley, & Voola, 2002; Radley & Kennedy, 1992).  
It should be noted that denial of responsibility is sometimes a consequence of not 
helping, rather than a cause. People are creative in finding post hoc excuses for not giving 
(Hibbert, Chatzidakis, & Smith, 2005). Ascription of responsibility is also a dispositional 
variable that determines people’s motivation to engage in helping behaviour (Bennett, 2003; 
Furnham, 1995; Schwartz, 1973, 1974). Denial of responsibility is related to the belief in a 
just world, the belief that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get 
(Appelbaum, 2002; Furnham, 1995; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). Econometric studies suggest 
that donors weigh the needs of distant others against the future needs of their own children. 
Parents give more to charities when their children are economically better off (G.E. Auten & 
Joulfaian, 1996; Joulfaian, 2004). They reduce giving to charities and increase bequests when 
their children’s income is lower. 
Identification of a specific victim. Solicitations for contributions that identify a specific 
victim are more likely to result in willingness to contribute (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b) 
and actual donations than solicitations that provide statistical information on the number of 
victims (Small & Loewenstein, 2003; Small, et al., 2007). Information about single victims is 
more vivid and more emotionally distressing than information about multiple unidentified 
victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b).  
Religious and political preferences. Finally, what constitutes need or whether a (group 
of) needy person(s) is also deserving of assistance is controversial. A participant in an 
Australian focus group study (Polonsky, et al., 2002) said: “What constitutes a need to one 
person is not to another.” Persons from different religious backgrounds (Will & Cochran, 
1995) and with different political preferences (Skitka, et al., 2002) may evaluate the same 
objective situation differently. 
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Overall strength of effect. The result of these moderating factors is that the overall effect of 
need on giving is small. It may well be that instead of the most needy, those with the best 
marketers receive the highest contributions (Polonsky, et al., 2002). Thus, it is the awareness 
of need that is related to giving rather than the objective need. As Milofsky and Blades (1991) 
point out, the largest health charities in the US include organizations for rare diseases like 
muscular dystrophy (affecting only 6 children in 100,000) and cystic fibrosis (affecting 20 in 
100,000).  
 
Mechanism 2: Solicitation 
Obviously, not all types of solicitations are equally effective. Ingredients of the most 
effective solicitations are discussed in the literature review under the other mechanisms. For 
instance, a solicitation for a contribution is likely to be more effective if giving in response to 
the solicitation provides an opportunity to acquire, maintain or strengthen a positive social 
reputation. In addition, some types of people may be more compliant with requests for 
charitable contributions than others. The analyses reported in Bryant et al. (2003) suggest this; 
however, because this study is based on survey data it may also reflect self-selection of these 
respondents. Finally, one remarkable study tested whether monetary compensation paid to 
solicitors for successful solicitations affects the likelihood of success (Gneezy & List, 2006). 
One group of solicitors were paid 100% more for going door to door than another group. The 
result was that an initially positive effect of overpayment waned after a few hours. 
 
Mechanism 3: Costs and benefits 
While we have found no studies that investigated moderators of the effects of material 
benefits of donations, many studies have examined moderators of the material costs of giving. 
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Price effects depend on the psychological benefits of donations, national context, 
characteristics of recipient organizations, and personal characteristics of donors. 
Psychological benefits. It makes a difference how price reductions are framed: when 
price reductions are presented as rebates - ‘when you give €1, you pay only €0.50’ - they are 
less effective than when presented as matches - ‘when you give €1, we’ll add another €1’; 
(Bekkers, 2005; Eckel & Grossman, 2003, 2004). It is believed that framing price reductions 
as rebates yields a perceptual focus on the material costs of donating. Framing price 
reductions as matches, in contrast, yields a perceptual focus on the benefits for beneficiaries 
of donations. However, other studies cast doubt on the generality (Fraser & Hite, 1989) and 
validity (Davis, Millner, & Reilly, 2005) of the framing effect.  
That the subjective perception of costs is important also becomes apparent from the 
‘low ball-effect’. The low ball technique refers to the practice of revealing hidden costs after 
people have expressed willingness to comply with a request (Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett, & 
Miller, 1978). For instance, people are first asked to donate a small amount (they are thrown 
the low ball), for example a donation to a museum of $0.75. After they have agreed to do so, 
an additional amount is requested, for example $0.25 for the museums children’s program 
(Brownstein & Katzev, 1985). Another set of findings illustrating that it matters how costs are 
perceived concern the ‘door-in-the-face effect’. This effect refers to the observation that 
people are more likely to comply with a request after they received a more sizeable request 
that they find unacceptable. Compared to the first, excessive request, the second appears as a 
small concession (Abrahams & Bell, 1994; Cialdini et al., 1975; Reingen, 1978). In a study by 
Brownstein and Katzev (1985), visitors to a museum were asked to donate $1 ‘to cover 
reduced funding’. In a control group, 73% did so; in an experimental group that first received 
a request to donate $5, 87% did so (though this difference is not statistically significant, pp. 
570-571). Fundraisers who want to use this technique should be aware that the first request 
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should be perceived as legitimate. If not, a boomerang effect may occur (Schwarzwald, Raz, 
& Zvibel, 1979). The Door-in-the-face effect can be enhanced by having a person make the 
request whose approval the potential donor finds more important (Williams & Williams, 
1989). 
National context. There are substantial differences between countries in the price of 
giving as well as in the price effect. Wong, Chua and Vassoo (1998) find much stronger price 
effects for donations in Singapore (varying from -2.0 to –5.5) than commonly found in U.S. 
studies; Wu, Huang and Kao (2004) find price effects ranging from –2.2 to –3.3 in Taiwan. 
However, UK residents seem to be less responsive to tax incentives (A. Jones & J. Posnett, 
1991; A. M. Jones & J. W. Posnett, 1991). In addition, there are also large differences in the 
extent that people choose to itemize their gifts. For example, in the Netherlands, religious 
groups use tax deductions extensively (Wiepking, 2007). But those religiously affiliated in 
Canada itemize rarely (Kitchen, 1992). Non-itemizers are less sensitive to changes in tax price 
(Duquette, 1999; Eaton, 2001). One reason may be that they don’t know about the deduction 
(McGregor-Lowndes, Newton, & Marsden, 2006). Obviously, if households do not know 
about the possibility of deducing donations from their tax income, they are unlikely to 
respond to tax incentives. In such cases, publicizing favourable tax treatment of charitable 
contributions is likely to increase the donor pool and/or the amount contributed (Boatright, 
Green, & Malbin, 2006). 
Subsector. Different studies find different price effects for different types of 
organizations. Widely different estimates are reported by Schiff (1990). Religious donations 
appear less price sensitive than donations to non-religious organizations in three studies 
(Feldstein, 1975b; McClelland & Kokoski, 1994; Taussig, 1967) but more price sensitive in 
another (Reece, 1979). Price effects on donations to international relief and development 
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organizations appear to be larger than on donations to other organizations (Ribar & Wilhelm, 
1995).  
Personal characteristics. Personal characteristics moderating the price effect include marriage 
and income. Married males are found to be more sensitive to the price of giving than married 
females (Andreoni & Payne, 2003). Price effects usually increase with income (G. E. Auten, 
Cilke, & Randolph, 1992; Duquette, 1999; Feldstein & Taylor, 1976; O'Neill, Steinberg, & 
Thompson, 1996; Robinson, 1990); some studies find that among the highest income groups 
price effects decline again (Boskin & Feldstein, 1977; Feldstein, 1975a; Taussig, 1967). A 
study of philanthropy in Singapore found that the tax price effect declined with education 
(Chua & Wong, 1999).  
 
Mechanism 4: Altruism 
Effects of altruism vary with the awareness of need and the efficacy of donations, the 
information about donations of others provided to potential donors, beliefs about changes in 
contributions by others; the size of contributions of others; fundraising activities by nonprofit 
organizations. Also, altruism effects differ between sectors receiving donations and between 
donors with different levels of income.  
Awareness of need and efficacy. If the nonprofit organization publicizes donations 
received, donors may react in several ways. If the need for contributions is perceived as lower 
because of the increase in contributions by others, donors may lower their own contribution. 
This tendency, however, may be offset by the quality signal sent out by the donations of 
others. If high status individuals made a contribution, donors may take that contribution as a 
signal that the charity is of a good quality, enhancing the organizations’ perceived 
trustworthiness and efficacy. 
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Amount contributed by others. Contributions by others may have decreasing marginal 
utility: studies of American theatres (Borgonovi, 2006) and symphony orchestras (Brooks, 
2000b) reveal that small increases in public funding have a stronger crowding-in effect than 
large increases. 
Subsector. Crowding out estimates appear to be stronger in the human services sector 
with a number of studies finding considerable crowding out (Amos, 1982; Ferris & West, 
2003; Hungerman, 2005; Payne, 1998; Schiff, 1990), while other studies find smaller or no 
crowding out effects (Brooks, 2002; Lindsey & Steinberg, 1990; Long, 2000; Reece, 1979; 
Steinberg, 1985). One study from the U.K. found slight crowding in (Posnett & Sandler, 
1989). Bielefeld, Rooney & Steinberg (2005) find that higher state social service spending is 
associated with a lower likelihood of households donating, but find no link with the amount 
contributed. For organizations in the health sector several studies find some crowding out 
(Brooks, 2000a; Khanna, Posnett, & Sandler, 1995). State funding for research has been 
found to crowd in private contributions (Connolly, 1997). Results for nonprofit organizations 
in the arts and culture sector have been mixed (Brooks, 1999, 2000a; Hughes & Luksetich, 
1999).  
Obviously, the effect of a third party contribution depends on the information about 
the third party contribution given to other potential donors. In many cases, donors do not 
know about changes in the contributions of others (Horne, Johnson, & Van Slyke, 2005). In 
most cases when government grants are announced, it is unclear to individuals that the grants 
are financed with taxes ultimately paid by citizens themselves. When this is made clear to 
individuals, third party contributions crowd out individual contributions (Eckel, Grossman, & 
Johnston, 2005). In ‘crowding out’ experiments, information about the behaviour of others is 
explicitly provided to participants. Hence, it should come as no surprise that laboratory 
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experiments usually find larger crowd-out estimates than studies using survey or tax data 
(Andreoni, 1993; Vesterlund, 2006).  
Fundraising activities. The net effect of a change in contributions from third parties 
depends on the reaction by the nonprofit organization. One potential reaction is to reduce 
fundraising efforts (Andreoni & Payne, 2003). Another potential reaction is to increase the 
number or quality of services rendered to donors. A study of American theatres revealed that 
government funding at both the state and federal level had a crowding in-effect on private 
contributions (Borgonovi, 2006), a finding potentially caused by the provision of more or 
better services paid for by government grants. 
Group size. The weight of altruistic concerns decreases with group size. In a large 
economy, individual contributions have little impact on the provision of public goods. 
Because most philanthropic organizations raise funds from a large audience, altruism is likely 
to be only a minor force (Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002). 
Income. One characteristic of donors examined as a moderator of crowding out effects 
is income. Altruism seems to decrease with income until $100,000, after which it increases 
(Andreoni, 1990). 
 
Mechanism 5. Reputation 
The effect of reputation on giving increases with the value of approval received by 
donors. The value of approval depends on the strength of ties with persons who may observe 
donation acts, liking of the solicitor, group size, social norms and social status of the donor 
and solicitor.  
Strong ties. Approval has a more pronounced effect when third parties with whom the 
potential donor has a stronger social bond (a ‘strong tie’) are able to observe the act of giving. 
In this condition, a mix of social and psychological benefits enhances the effect of reputation. 
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When a complete stranger can observe giving, there is less social pressure than when a friend 
or family member is present. Social pressure is especially strong when a strong tie makes a 
request for a donation. A survey study on giving intentions showed that solicitations by 
persons at a closer social distance are more likely to be honoured (Bekkers, 2004). Evidence 
on the impact of relationship strength on donations from surveys is mixed. While Sokolowski 
(1996) found that being asked to contribute by a significant other does not increase the total 
amount donated, Schervish and Havens (1997) find that people who are asked to give by a 
relative or a friend donate a larger percentage of their income. Booth, Higgins and Cornelius 
(Booth, Higgins, & Cornelius, 1989) find that per capita United Way contributions are higher 
in communities with stable populations and higher voter turnout. Not giving in social contexts 
where peers value giving and are important in daily life would not only endanger one’s 
reputation, but also the relationship with these peers.  
Psychological benefits: liking of solicitor. The value of approval increases with liking 
of the solicitor, which increases the psychological benefits of donating. One way to increase 
liking is through similarity (Byrne, 1971). Requests by similar persons are more likely to be 
honoured because we like them better. Field experiments on helping behaviour have found 
similarity effects for religion (Yinon & Sharon, 1985), race (Bryan & Test, 1967; Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 1977), gender (Bryan & Test, 1967; Lindskold, Forte, Haake, & Schmidt, 1977), 
social attitudes (Sole, Marton, & Hornstein, 1975), educational institution (Aune & Basil, 
1994; Howard, Gengler, & Jain, 1995), and personal characteristics such as sharing a birthday 
or name (Burger, Messian, Patel, del Prado, & Anderson, 2004). 
Even when total strangers solicit contributions, familiarity with these strangers created 
by a brief unrelated dialogue increases the likelihood of contributions, possibly because 
familiarity increases liking (Dolinski, Grzyb, Olejnik, Prusakowski, & Urban, 2005; Dolinski, 
Nawrat, & Rudak, 2001; Macaulay, 1975). Increased liking is also a likely explanation for the 
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finding that students tend to give more to professors who remember their name (Howard, et 
al., 1995). 
Another mundane factor that promotes liking is beauty. A few studies have found that 
people are more likely to give to physically attractive people (Landry, Lange, List, Price, & 
Rupp, 2006; West & Brown, 1975; Wiesenthal, Austrom, & Silverman, 1983). One study 
found this to be the case more strongly for males answering the door (Landry, et al., 2006). 
This may be a reason why female solicitors are sometimes more successful than male 
solicitors (Lindskold, et al., 1977). One survey study on alumni giving found an opposite sex-
effect (Belfield & Beney, 2000), but an experimental study did not (Bekkers, 2007).  
Attire may also moderate the effect of approval. Well-dressed solicitors raised more 
money in two studies, (Levine, Bluni, & Hochman, 1998; Williams & Williams, 1989), but 
not in two others (Bull & Gibson-Robinson, 1981; McElroy & Morrow, 1994). 
Group size. The value of approval increases with the number of persons recognizing 
the gift. One study found that people give more when accompanied by others, especially by 
females (Jiobu & Knowles, 1974). Another study we found tested the effect of multiple 
solicitors. When requests for donations are made by two solicitors, people are more likely to 
give – though less than twice (Jackson & Latané, 1981). 
Social norms. The value of approval also increases with the perceived desirability of 
giving among one’s peers. Religious persons are expected to be more generous than the non-
religious (Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008). A failure to give has a more negative effect on the 
reputation of religious persons than on that of non-religious persons (Bailey & Young, 1986).  
Social status. Social status of both the donor and the solicitor enhance the value of 
approval. When people are solicited for a donation by a person of higher social status, they 
are more likely to give (Jackson & Latané, 1981; Pandey, 1979; Vriens, Scheer, Hoekstra, & 
Bult, 1998). One study found that Baptists in the Netherlands donated more when ministers 
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recommend an offering (Soetevent, 2005). Also when the potential donor has a higher social 
status she is more likely to give, probably because the norm to give is stronger. The 
expression ‘noblesse oblige’ represents this observation. The elite is given a special obligation 
to look after those lower on the status rank of society. Not giving would endanger one’s elite 
position (Odendahl, 1990; Ostrower, 1997). 
Need for social approval. Some individuals may be more sensitive to social approval 
for helping, and react more strongly to the observability of a donation (Satow, 1975). Such 
individuals are likely to have an altruistic self-image, which will be discussed below 
(mechanism 6). 
Overall strength of effect. Reputation has a strong effect on giving. It may easily 
overpower effects by other mechanisms. This holds for the costs mechanism, for instance. 
When asked for a contribution to a charitable cause by one’s spouse, the amount requested 
does not matter (Bekkers, 2004). Spouses also draw each other into volunteering (Rotolo & 
Wilson, 2006). One study found reputation to have a stronger effect than awareness of need. 
In this study, the effect of reputation in face-to-face solicitations, even by unknown solicitors, 
was so strong that it took away the effect of a picture of beneficiaries. In a direct-mail 
campaign for the same cause, the picture increased donations (Thornton, et al., 1991). 
 
Mechanism 6. Psychological benefits 
In the discussion of moderators of the other mechanisms, we have included 
psychological benefits. From the perspective of the other mechanisms, psychological benefits 
enhance the effects of these mechanisms. Viewed from the perspective of the psychological 
benefits, one could also say that the other mechanisms enhance the effects of psychological 
benefits.  
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We have not yet discussed the interaction between psychological benefits and 
solicitation. Such an interaction occurs in the foot-in-the-door effect (DeJong, 1981; Gueguen 
& Fischer-Lokou, 1999; Pliner, Hart, Kohl, & Saari, 1974; Reingen, 1978; Rittle, 1981; 
Seligman, Bush, & Kirsch, 1976; Williams & Williams, 1989). It is believed that the initial 
small request creates or activates a self-image of helpfulness, which creates pressure to 
behave in a helpful manner on a subsequent occasion. In line with the self-image explanation, 
the effect of an initial request is reduced when pay is offered in return for compliance with the 
initial request (Zuckerman, Lazzaro, & Waldgeir, 1979). Another study found that when the 
first request is too small to activate a helpful self-image, it does not increase compliance with 
the second request (Seligman, et al., 1976). However, it should be noted that alternative 
explanations for the Foot-in-the-door effect are possible (Kilbourne & Kilbourne, 1984). One 
alternative explanation is that the first request heightens awareness of need. 
However, the foot in the door-technique does not always work. Brownstein and 
Katzev (1985) found that first asking to sign a petition in support of an art institution did not 
increase compliance with a subsequent request for a donation for this art institution. Allison, 
Messick and Samuelson (1985) found that sending a flyer with a questionnaire actually 
reduced the amount contributed subsequently. Weyant (1996) found a negative effect of the 
foot-in-the-door technique in a door-to-door collection for the American Cancer Society.  
 
Mechanism 7. Values 
Very few studies have tested for moderators in relationships of values with 
philanthropy. An exception is Fong (2007), showing that humanitarianism/egalitarianism is 
only positively related to donations to welfare recipients when the recipients appeared more 
worthy of support. Another exception is a recent study of guilt appeals, showing that feelings 
of responsibility are increased by the presence of others who may approve of donations (Basil, 
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Ridgway, & Basil, 2006). Also, a survey study revealed that contributions to religion are less 
strongly related to social values than contributions to other organizations (Bekkers & Schuyt, 
2008). 
 
Mechanism 8. Efficacy 
We have not found any experimental studies showing how effects of efficacy are 
moderated by other factors. One survey study shows that perceived efficacy is more strongly 
related to donations to religious causes, international relief, and domestic public benefit 
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